China, árbitro de Estados Unidos

El 20 de noviembre, el gobernador del Banco Central de China, desalienta las esperanzas norteamericanas puestas en un ajuste del yuan: uno de los puntos centrales en el forcejeo entre ambos, lejos de salir según las expectativas puestas por Obama en su viaje. Zhou Xiaochuan dice respecto al papel chino en la cotización de la moneda, en la noticia de El Economista:

El gobernador del Banco Popular de China (PBOC), Zhou Xiaochuan, aseguró hoy que el país asiático desarrolla un papel "pasivo" en la cotización monetaria del dólar estadounidense.

Zhou, que participaba en un foro económico en la capital china, respondió así a las críticas recibidas desde Estados Unidos de que Pekín mantiene el yuan artificialmente devaluado. "Es como estar presenciando un torneo. Sólo miramos el juego", declaró el gobernador.

Esta posición socarrona parece difícil de entender, pero está sólidamente fundada en la actual dependencia de Estados Unidos respecto a China. Dependencia basada en el desequilibrio comercial entre los dos países, las conveniencias corporativas, y la tenencia de activos financieros americanos en manos del Estado chino. Aunque esta interrelación implica también una interdependencia: China tampoco podría fácilmente abandonar a Estados Unidos. En mayo de este año David Leonhardt del New York Times, se ha ocupado de este problema en un excelente artículo. Algunos aspectos de su análisis:

Over the past decade, China and the United States have developed a deeply symbiotic, and dangerous, relationship. China discovered that an economy built on cheap exports would allow it to grow faster than it ever had and to create enough jobs to mollify its impoverished population. American consumers snapped up these cheap exports — shoes, toys, electronics and the like — and China soon found itself owning a huge pile of American dollars. Governments don’t like to hold too much cash, because it pays no return, so the Chinese bought many, many Treasury bonds with their dollars. This additional demand for Treasuries was one big reason (though not the only reason) that interest rates fell so low in recent years. Thanks to those low interest rates, Americans were able to go on a shopping spree and buy some things, like houses, they couldn’t really afford. China kept lending and exporting, and we kept borrowing and consuming. It all worked very nicely, until it didn’t.

The most obviously worrisome part of the situation today is that the Chinese could decide that they no longer want to buy Treasury bonds. The U.S. government’s recent spending for bank bailouts and stimulus may be necessary to get the economy moving again, but it also raises the specter of eventual inflation, which would damage the value of Treasuries. If the Chinese are unnerved by this, they could instead use their cash to buy the bonds of other countries, which would cause interest rates here to jump, prolonging the recession. Wen Jiabao, China’s premier, seemed to raise this possibility in March, in remarks to reporters at the end of the annual session of China’s Parliament. “We have lent a huge amount of money to the U.S.,” Wen said. “Of course we are concerned about the safety of our assets. To be honest, I am definitely a little worried.” In all likelihood, this was mostly posturing. Were China to cut back sharply on its purchase of Treasury bonds, it would send the value of the bonds plummeting, hurting the Chinese, who already own hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth. Yet Wen’s comments, which made headlines around the world, did highlight an underlying truth. The relationship between the United States and China can’t continue on its current path.

Leonhardt apunta que esta relación de mutua conveniencia (o al fin, inconveniencia), ya ha jugado un papel en la gran crisis de este año, aparte de la señalada arriba bajando los intereses de los mercados financieros:

It has already helped create the global economic crisis, by splashing cheap money around the world and enabling American indebtedness and overconsumption. This country is now suffering through its worst recession since the early 1980s, one that could ultimately become the worst since the Great Depression. In China, the collapse of global trade has eliminated 20 million jobs along the industrial southern coast, according to Beijing’s official numbers. One Obama adviser told me the real number may be much higher.

[...] Even more to the point, China, like the United States, is now paying a price for the two countries’
co-dependent relationship. The coastal cities that experienced tremendous booms over the past decade are struggling with mass unemployment. Millions of recent college graduates, the demographic that often starts protest movements, are unemployed across China. Stocks have fallen more sharply than they have here.

Leonhardt avanza en cómo resolver el problema, que a su juicio tiene dos contrapartes: Estados Unidos consumiendo menos (comprando menos), y China consumiendo más (destinando su producción al mercado interno). Una ecuación difícil, especialmente del lado chino.
Nuevos vientos en el mundo, y no muy favorables a Estados Unidos. El viaje de Obama a China lo demuestra.

La imágen de una bandera estadounidense en transición a una china, ilustra el artículo del New York Times.